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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KE:NNBCOTT COPPER CORPO-
RATION, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE IXDGSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION" OF UTAH and ROBERT 
E. ~IARKUS, Defendants. 
Case No. 
10534 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
STATEl\IENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an original proceedings before the Supreme 
Court of Utah for the purpose of having the lawfulness 
of an award dated December 14, 1965 of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah in a proceedings entitled Robert 
E . .Markus, Applicant, vs. Kennecott Copper Corpo-
ration, defendant, Claim No. 6315, inquired into and 
determined as provided by Section 35-1-83, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended by Laws of Utah, 1965. 
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DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH 
The Industrial Commission of Utah, on December 
14, 1965, upon rehearing to consider the medical pane/1 
report, ordered that Kennecott Copper Corporatiu11 
pay Robert E. lVIarkus temporary total compensati01, 
from June 7, 1964 until Mr. Markus was released bi 
his physician; that Kennecott Copper Corporation pa; 
all medical and hospital expenses, but not in excess of 
the Commission medical fee schedule; that Kennecott 
Copper Corporation pay Mr. Markus permanent par· 
tial disability for 10% loss of bodily function, or 20 
weeks at $51.40 per week for a total of $1,~278.00; 
and further ordered that Matt Baljanic be awarded 
$150.00 attorney's fees. 
The Commisson then denied a Motion for Review 
filed by Kennecott Copper Corporation on January 13. 
1966. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIE'V 
Robert E. Markus seeks to have the award of the 
Industrial Commission of December 14, 1965 sustained 
by the Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Markus, on the 16th day of May, 1964, at or 
about 10 :00 o'clock A.M., was underneath the wheels 
of a derailed train car for the purpose of rerailing said 
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train car. This was part of his duties as a brakeman 
and was done in the course of his employment ( R. 33) . 
~Ir. l\Iarkus testified that he received a sharp pain 
between his shoulder blades while he was pushing a 
frog up under the wheels of the train in order to rerail 
said train car ( R. 32) . A frog is an instrument used 
to rerail train cars and weighs between 50 and 100 
pounds ( R. 33) . This process of rerailing requires the 
operator to lie on his back while raising up and pushing 
the frog and thus putting great strain on the upper 
part of the body. Mr. :Marcus complained of the injury 
to his engineer on the day he received the injury (R. 
;35). Howeyer, it was not until the following Monday, 
.May 18, 1964 that he could see a Kennecott Copper 
doctor ( R. 34) . 
The doctor told him that it was just a muscle sprain 
and for )1r .. Marcus to come back if it got worse. No 
x-rays or other examinations were taken (R. 34-35). 
The applicant continued to work, but continued to do 
so with considerable pain. 
On or about June l, 1964 .l\lr. Markus went on 
vacation to California; while in California the pain 
became so seYere he was required to go to a clinic for 
treatment at Compton, California. Upon the advice 
0f the clinic )1r. :Marcus saw a neurosurgeon in Downey, 
California and, upon the complete examination by the 
neurosurgeon, was advised that he should be hospital-
ized for further treatment (R. 36). whereupon Mr. 
Markus decided to come back to Salt Lake City where 
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he was examined by Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson IR. 
36). Upon Dr. Hebertson's advice, Mr. Markus was 
hospitalized and put in traction for approximately one 
week. Tests were taken and upon the finding of three 
discs out of place, Dr. Hebertson called in Dr. Boyrl 
G. Holbrook and Dr. Thomas D. Noonan to perform 
an operation upon Mr. Markus. 
Mr. Markus filed a claim with the Industral Com· 
mission of Utah on August 26, 1964 (R. 4). A hearing 
was held on December 7, 1964 at which no medical 
testimony was allowed (R. 11). On February 17. 
1965 the Commission denied Mr. Markus' claim (R. 
83). A Petition for Rehearing was filed with the Com-
mission on March 8, 1965 ( R. 84-86) . The Commission, 
by a general order, denied the Petition for Rehearing 
on March 12, 1965. 
On or about April 8, 1965, the attorney for the 
applicant prepared a Writ of Certiorari to have the 
Commission's Order of March 13, 1965 reviewed by the · 
Supreme Court. Prior to filing the Writ of Certiorari 
on the above mentioned date, the attorney for the appli· · 
cant was informed by Commissioner Otto Wisley that 
the Order dated March 12, 1965 would be vacated; that 
as a matter of law the Commission did not have the 
right to prevent the introduction of medical testimony 
by the applicant. Ruth Griffith v. The Industrial Com· 
mission, 16 U. 2d 264, 399 P.2d 204, 1965. 
Attorney for the applicant, relying on the repre· 
sentations of Commissioner Wiesley that the Industrial 
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Commission would vacate its Order of March 12, 1965, 
well within the statutory time for appeal, did not file 
the 'Vrit of Certiorari with the court. 
On the 13th day of April, 1965 the Industrial Com-
mission vacated its Order of March 12, 1965 and granted 
to the applicant a rehearing of the matter to allow intro· 
duction of competent medical testimony on behalf of 
the applicant. 
On the 12th day of July, 1965, a rehearing wa~• 
hel<l to allow the introduction of competent medical tes-
timony. Subsequent to the rehearing, the medical tes· 
timony and issues were submitted to a medical panel. 
After examination of the applicant by the medical panel 
appointed by the Commission, a report was filed ( R. 
94) . The findings were as follows: 
( 1) The type of maneuver as described by the 
patient could be conceived to cause the her-
niation of the cervical intervertebral disc 
giving rise to nerve root pain. 
(2) The surgery performed was indicated and 
successfully relieved the majority of the 
individual's symptoms. 
( 3) Resulting limitation of motion in the neck 
and the atrophy and weakness in the right 
arm would give rise to a 10 percent perma-
nent partial disability of the body as a 
whole. (R. 95). 
There were no objections filed as to this medical report 
(R. 96). 
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The Commission, on December 14, 1965, granted 
an award to the applicant of permanent partial dis-, 
ability for 10% loss of bodily function or 20 weeb 
at $51.40 for a total of $1,028.00, and further ordered 
that plaintiff pay applicant's attorney the sum ol ' 
$150.00 for legal services on behalf of the applicant. 
Kennecott Copper Corporation then filed a Motion 
for Review which was denied January 13, 1966. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF , 
UTAH HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE 
ORDER OF APRIL 13, 1965 GRANTING THE 
PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
It is the defendant's contention that the Industrial 
Commission had jurisdiction to issue its Order of April , 
13, 1965 granting the Petition for Rehearing in that: 
( l) The Industrial Commission never lost juris· 
diction in the matter as a full hearing had never been 
granted. 
(2) By virue of Section 35-1-78 U.C.A. 1953 a~ 
amended, the Industrial Commission had continuin~ 
jurisdiction over the case and was acting within its 
powers under that Section. 
Defendant further claims that as Kennecott Cop· 
per Corporation was present at the rehearing granted 
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bv the Industrial Commission, it had submitted itself 
t~ the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission and, 
therefore, has no right to now argue the Commission's 
lack of jurisdiction. 
The Industrial Commission in its first hearing of 
the case, allowed absolutely no medical evidence to be 
introduced into the record. The defendant was prepared 
to introduce medical testimony corroborating his testi-
mony as to the injury resulting from an accident on 
the job. The exclusion of the medical testimony was 
prejudicial to the defendant in that the issue of an 
mternal injury can only be answered by proper inquiry 
by a medical panel competent to determine whether or 
not such an injury could be caused by the facts as 
alleged by the applicant. It is the contention of the 
applicant that because of the denial of introduction of 
medical testimony the applicant was denied a complete 
hearing as contended by the Legislature under our 
'Yorkman's Compensation statutes. The Supreme 
Court has clearly followed this contention in a recent 
case, Ruth Griffith v. The Industrial Commission, 16 
l:.2d 264, 299 P.2d 204-206, 1965. 
"'Vhere the injury complained of affects the 
internal anatomy, by what means but through 
medical testimony can petitioner prove that her 
ailments were caused by the accident?" 
It is this fact that establishes the proposition that the 
lndusrial Commission ha<l not relinquished its juris-
diction oYer the matter. By granting a rehearing, 
the Industrial Commission was correcting an error 
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on its part. This correction was intended to save 
an unnecessary appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Utah. As Mr. Biljanic, attorney for applicant, stat. 
ed at the rehearing, the basis for defendant's Peti-
tion for Rehearing was to put medical testimony into 
the record, a right that had previously been denied 
(R. 99), and it is significant to note that the Order 
of the Commission denying recovery to the applicant 
of February 17, 1965 states that the Commission denied 
recovery on the basis that there was no competent 
medical testimony of record (R. 83). This writer would 
like to point out that it was by the Commission's own 
act that competent medical testimony was refused by 
the Commission and that as stated elsewhere in the 
defendant's Brief, the Commission represented to ap· 
plicant's attorney that it was vacating the Order of 
March 12, 1965 at which a rehearing was denied to , 
the applicant on the basis of Griffith v. The Industrial 
Commission, supra, and that this action would be ac· 
complished within the statutory time for appeal. 
The Industrial Commission, because it had not 
given a complete hearing as demanded by law, corrected 
the error and had the jurisdictional power to do so. 
Defendant further contends that under Section 
35-1-78, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, the Industrial Com· 1 
mission, when it granted the Order for Rehearing. 
would have jurisdiction of this case. Section 35-1-78 
U.C.A. 1953 as amended, gives the Industrial Com· 
mission continuing jurisdiction over each case with the 
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power to mod~fy or cha~ge ~revious orders or findin~s 
as in its opimon seem Justified. The purpose of this 
Section is to take care of changed conditions or develop-
ments of any kind in order to do justice to the injured 
party. This court has stated in Carter v. Industrial 
Commission, 76 U. 520, 433, 290 P. 776: 
"The continuing jurisdiction of industrial com-
mission is not limited to consideration of changes 
in physical condition of workmen, but is extended 
to right to rescind, alter, or amend orders, deci-
sions, or awards on good cause appearing there-
for. In other words, the _commission under this 
section has a wide discretion in the exercise of 
its continuing jurisdiction conferred upon it, and 
doctrine of res adjudicata and other common-
law doctrines do not apply." 
The Commission, failing to hear medical testimony 
in this case, and by virtue of Section 35-1-78 U.C.A. 
1953 as amended, had the jurisdiction to correct its 
error and allow the rehearing. 
In light of the court's recent decision in Griffith 
v. Industrial Commission, supra, it would seem that the 
plaintiff's arguments that the defendant failed to file 
a 1Vrit of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah 
within the 30 days after denial of the rehearing dated 
March 12, 1965 and, therefore, exhausted his remedy, 
is purely academic and has no merit. In the case Griffith 
vs. Industrial Commission, supra, the court stated: 
"\Vhen service of notice is made by mail, Rule 
6 ( e), U.R.C.P. allows three days additional to 
file .... 'Ve believe and hold that Rule 6 ( e), 
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not inconsistent and not clearly inapplicable wit! 
procedure of the Commission, supplements t[, 
procedure of the Commission." · 
As the Industrial Commission's Order denying rehear· 
ing was mailed to the defendant, and applying tlv 
court's reasoning, the Commission's Order of April l:J. 
1965 granting the Petition of Rehearing came out be. 
fore the defendant's time had expired to petition th" 
Supreme Court. The Order denying the Petition for. 
Rehearing was dated .March 12, 1965; an extra three 
days was given under Rule 6 ( e) U.R.C.P.; the de· 
fendants had until April 14, 1965 to file its \Yrit .1! 
Certiorari for the purpose of having the Commissim:, 
Orders denying compensation and rehearing refused. 
It is further contended that the plaintiff submitteJ 
to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission at the 
time of rehearing. If the plaintiff were going to raise 
a question of jurisdiction, that would have been the 
proper time, rather than after the hearing and the' 
awarding contrary to plaintiff's desires. 
The procedure the plaintiff has chosen here is one 
of seeking to have a determination by the Commission 
in its favor, then to have the Supreme Court review this· 
determination on the basis or lack of jurisdiction in 
the event said final award was in favor of defendant. 
This clearly is not what the Legislature intended in 
passing the act. The purpose of the Workman's Corn· 
pensation Act is to protect workmen within the limit\ 
procured by the Act and thus the Act must be cou· 
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strued liberally in order to make such legislative intent 
effectual. Considering the intent of the Legislature, 
the injured party should not be penalized or barred 
from recovery because of technicalities and rigid inter-
pretation of the laws. 
POINT II 
THERE \VERE FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND EVIDENCE 
TO SL'PPORT THE A\VARD OF THE IN-
DUSTRIAL CO~IMISSION. 
The Plaintiff in its Brief recognizes that the In-
dustrial Commission is vested with the exclusive power 
and responsibility of deciding questions of fact. A 
reading of the record of this matter would certainly 
indicate that the Commission was justified in awarding 
the recovery to the applicant and that the award is cer-
tainly based upon material, substantial and competent 
legal evidence. The applicant, Mr. Robert E. Markus, 
on cross examination by Mr. Evans, the attorney for 
Kennecott Copper Corporation, testified as follows: 
Q. And to put that frog in place you would push 
it up by the wheel, wouldn't you? 
A. No. It's practically impossible to push it on 
the rocks. Because the rocks hang up on this 
little gadget under the frog. So you have to 
lift and push at the same time. Otherwise, 
you can't get it over the rocks. It's hard to 
slide through rocks or dirt. 
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Q. But in any event you were sliding this fr0,1 
and you weren't lifting the whole weight g, 
the frog to get it up in place, were you! 
1 
A. I was straining and lifting as much as I pos-
sibly could to get it up there, because then · 
is no such thing as just being able to push it 
Because it's practically impossible to do j; 
that way. (R. 40-41). 
In the Plaintiff's Brief, plaintiff goes to gm! 
length to make a distinction between lifting and push· 
ing. This writer will not belabor the point; howeYer 
the testimony is clear that the applicant was both lifting , 
and pushing as mentioned hereinabove. 
The Commission, in its Order dated February Ii, 
1965, states that the attorney for the applicant sug 
gested lifting (R. 83). The above cited testimony indi· 
cates that these facts were established by the attorney 
for Kennecott Copper Corporation. 
Again, on redirect examination, the applicant 
reiterated that he was lifting the rerailing device known 
1 
as the frog (R. 49). 'Vitnesses, Mr. Asay and )Ir. 
Strand, who testified at the first hearing that on the · 
day of the alleged accident the applicant appeared to 
be alright in the morning, but after the train was re· . 
railed, Mr. Strand said: 
" ... he was going around like an old man that , 
was hurt." ( R. 57) . 
Dr. Boyd Holbrook testified that the applicanb , 
history as related to him was that the applicant had 
been under the wheels of a derailed train car and was 
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lifting and developed a sudden pain between his shoulder 
blades (R. 102). He further testified that a myelogram 
erformed by Dr. Hebertson showed a large defect on 
ri1e right side of the lower neck (R. 103). Plaintiff, 
in its Brief, states that the hypothetical question pro-
posed to Dr. Holbrook by applicant's attorney was not 
based on facts that were in evidence; therefore, he con-
tends that the opinion of Dr. Holbrook was improper. 
Mr. Biljanic, attorney for the applicant at the rehear-
ing, proposed the following hypothetical question to 
Dr. Holbrook: 
" ... Assume if you will an injury on January 
12, 1963, as elicited by Mr. Evans. Assume fur-
ther that an individual over a year later is situ-
ated under a railroad car, and raising, lifting 
and pushing a 75-Pound object over and away 
from his body, under a railroad car. Can you give 
an opinion as to the likelihood of one suffering 
an injury such as the one as Mr. Marcus sus-
tained?" ( R. 106). 
The facts in the hypothetical question proposed by 
applicant's attorney are based upon facts and evidence 
which are clearly a part of the testimony and record. 
Dr. Holbrook, in response to the above hypothetical 
question, testified that it was likely that the applicant 
sustained an injury at the time he was rerailing the 
train car (R. 107-108). 
The Industrial Commission appointed a medical 
panel consisting of Norman R. Beck, M.D., Chairman; 
Sherman S. Coleman, M.D.; and Samuel Taylor, M.D., 
1'·hich met on August 27, 1965. l\1r. Markus was ex-
13 
amined by the panel at the time of said meeting. c
1
, 
conclusion of the medical examination the panel m:1, 
the following finding: 
( 1) The type of maneuver as described br 1: 
patient could be conceived to cause th~ nc 
niation of the cervical intervertebral 1j,. 
giving rise to nt;_rve root pain. 
( 2) The surgery p~_rformed was indicated :u: 
successfully relieved the majority of 11 
individual's symptoms. 
( 3) Resulting limitation of motion in the ne1 
and the atrophy and weakness in the rig1 
arm would give rise to 10 percent perruc 
nent partial disability of the body a., 
whole. 
The Commission, after review of all the materiJ 
substantial and competent evidence and testimony in\rr· 
duced at the time of the hearings on this matter, ot 
December 14, 1965 made a finding that there had beet 
an accident and that the applicant was entitled to rec01 
ery (R. 115). The Commission's award was certainl1 
based upon competent evidence and testimony as meE 
tioned above. The medical panel found the extent 11 
the injury and the type of injury claimed by the appli· 
cant could have been caused by the activities ana 
maneuvers that Mr. Markus alleged caused his injuD 
CONCLUSION 
This writer in several instances has pointed oui. 
competent evidence and testimony introduced at the 
time of the hearings in this matter contained in !lit 
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record and transcripts. It should be noted that the In-
dustrial Commission is sole Judge of the credibility of 
witnesses, weight of evidence and facts, and their deci-
~ion thereon is final if there is any substantial evidence 
to sustain it. Chief Consol. Min. Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 70 U. 333, 260 P. 271. Defendant respectfully 
submits that the award of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah dated December 14, 1965, be sustained in favor 
of defendant Markus in that it was justified by the 
record of the proceedings and evidence before the Com-
mission properly weighed the evidence and the credi-
bility of the witnesses. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Utah Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Defendant The 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
MATT BILJANIC 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 
and 
EVERETT E. DAHL 
760 East Center Street 
Midvale, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Robert E. Markus 
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